Few Nigerians, as well as the many people active in Commonwealth, international, and human rights movements, chose to ignore the impact that General Sani Abacha, Nigeria’s seventh military head of state, had on them.
He thought back to the unfathomable African shame of Idi Amin or the bogeyman Sese Soko Mobutu at one end of the political perception spectrum. At the other extreme, General Abacha represented the powerful leader who alone could bring an unruly and divided Nigeria to a level of political stability and economic sustainability consistent with its expectations and potential on the continent, despite lacking the obvious honesty and “Good Old Jack” goodwill of the earlier General Gowon or the breathtaking wizardry in selling the past of his immediate predecessor, General Ibrahim Babangida.
Following that, promotions happened as frequently as Aldershot drill parades: from lieutenant to captain to major to brigadier in 1980 after a seven-year hiatus in the colonel rank. Promotions to lieutenant in 1966, captain to major, and major to major followed.
At the time of his promotion to general, Sani Abacha had just turned 40. In order to advance his military credentials, he attended the School of Infantry at Warminster in 1971, the Nigerian Staff College at Jaji in 1976, and the prestigious Nigerian Institute of Political Studies (NIPS) at Kuru in 1981. He was too young to have served in many command positions during the Biafran War (1967–1970). Finally, he went to Monterey, California, for the US Senior International Defense Course.
But this aloof and reserved young officer was more than just his outward façade of unwavering professionalism, as Nigerians realized in 1983. When General Buhari overthrew Shehu Shagari’s disastrous Second Republic in December 1983, Abacha was the one to break the news over the radio in the following words: “I, Brigadier Sani Abacha, dot. He was given a position on the ruling Supreme Military Council.
Abacha was once again heavily involved in the overthrow of General Buhari and the ascent of General Babangida two years later, in another of those West African coups that appeared to draw strength from the public holiday paralysis of the Christmas/New Year shutdown. He received recognition for his efforts by being promoted to Major-General, chosen to serve as Army Chief of Staff, and elected to the new Armed Forces Ruling Council.
Abacha, who survived the purge of Babangida’s officers in late 1989, was crucial in putting an end to the perilous mutiny led by Major Orkar in Lagos in April 1990. This mutiny had overtones of ethnic secessionism. The President himself came dangerously close to being killed.
Abacha was not a prominent figure in the Babangida regime because he preferred the shadows to the spotlight. Following numerous delays in Babangida’s handover plans—which led one eminent Nigerianist scholar to mockingly refer to the seemingly pointless transition process as “Transition Without End”—and in the wake of the disastrous so-called Abiola general election in June 1993, Babangida was eventually persuaded to cede power to an interim national government (ING) led by the businessman Ernest Shonekan. Many people were shocked to learn that Abacha would be the new government’s minister of defense.
Shonekan abruptly announced his resignation on November 17th, less than 100 days after taking office. He handed over control to Sani Abacha, confirming the widely held belief that not only was this the third coup d’etat orchestrated by Sani Abacha, but that he had actually been the driving force behind the ING ever since it had taken office.
All the state organs that had been so intricately built during the Transition era were dismantled by Abacha the very next day. Military officials took over as the new governors’ replacements. As is customary for newly appointed military heads of state, he stated his intention to immediately transfer power to a elected civilian government.
In order to accomplish this, he pledged to convene a conference to decide the future of the nation’s constitution. The carefully crafted constitution of the purported Third Republic, already promulgated in 1989 for introduction in 1992, was instantly destroyed by him as he effectively restored the constitution of 1979.
If Abacha had previously played a significant but supporting role, he has now taken center stage both internally and internationally. In 1993 and again in a 1995 purge, general Babangida-supporting officers were removed from office and made to retire under duress. Even further, General Obansanjo, his internationally renowned predecessor as head of state from 1976 to 1979, was detained by Abacha.
On October 1, 1998—the anniversary of Nigeria’s independence from Great Britain in 1960—civil rule was to resume. If the prospect of three more years of military rule in an undemocratic Nigeria shocked the international community, the execution of Ogoni leaders by Abacha in November 1995 incensed it.
The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, which is being held in Auckland, New Zealand, was horrified by the deterioration of human rights in Nigeria and approved the historic decision to suspend Nigeria from the Commonwealth (expulsion is outside of their purview). The main adversary of Abacha’s Nigeria in the months that followed was Canada, who took President Mandela’s place.
The ad hoc Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) did not have an easy task, and it was noticeable that African members started to unite behind Nigeria and accept the transition plan for 1998. A movement to convince Abacha to run for president in 1998, following the “from uniform to agbada” model of Mobutu and Rawlings, or to maintain his current military rule existed in Nigeria at the same time (whether inspired or genuinely grassroots).
Abacha was one of the less well-known Nigerian Heads of State because he avoided traveling frequently, whether it was within or outside of Nigeria. His wife, Maryam Jiddah, whom he married in 1965, adopted an unusually high profile in public affairs and international conferences among Nigeria’s First Ladies. Initiating Nigeria’s Family Support Program, she later became known as “The Crusading First Lady” for hosting the first summit of First Ladies of Africa in 1997.
Following the eventual success of ECOMOG, the Economic Community’s Monitoring Group (in actuality, a significant military force), in bringing peace to war-torn Liberia, Abacha later this year ordered his troops into Sierra Leone to assist in restoring the country’s ousted president Kabbah, ironically portraying General Abacha as upholding military intervention in the name of democracy—a practice he notably failed to practice at home.
Initial reports of General Sani Abacha’s serious illness surfaced in September 1997, but they were quickly refuted. Despite the campaign for him to run for president in 1998, General Sani Abacha died with a low level of popularity ratings to his credit due to his ruthless contempt for democracy at home and his growing isolation on the international stage due to his appalling record on human rights. The true value of Nigeria under its ninth president in 38 years must ultimately be determined by his legacy rather than his performance as leader.
